Multi-dimensional Peace Talks

By: Dr. G. Rauf Roashan
Originally Posted On: April 03, 2010
Category: Country Corner



President Karzai of Afghanistan plays a complex game of politics in deciding to talk peace with the insurgency. He should consider the many faces of the die before tossing them in this delicate and complex game.


Politics is like chess a game at its best and at its worst at the same time. But often when chess is played outside tournament halls in Afghanistan, every spectator plays on both sides. They suggest moves to both sides, make noise, pretend that they too have stakes in the game. But now in the political game that President Karzai is playing with his opponents, namely Taleban and other lesser groups of insurgency, a whole international spectator group constitutes the onlookers who suggest moves, criticize, show that they also have stakes in the game and make predictions as to the outcome.

The question is whether Afghan president sought support from the international community during the London Conference to conduct peace talks with insurgency in Afghanistan to find a definitive solution to the problem of war and insecurity or was it a face saving effort on his own part.

Mr. Karzai is increasingly losing popularity with his supporters outside and inside the country. President Obama's surprise visit to Kabul last week was to emphasize in a diplomatic way his dissatisfaction with developments in Afghanistan in many areas including governance and especially corruption. While the United States has remained mostly silent on the issue of the peace negotiations with the insurgency in Afghanistan, it has not shown any optimism for their results, nor has it changed any of its policies or strategies of fighting against them. The US could also not be happy about the invitation extended by Karzai for Iranian president to visit Kabul and speak have another forum inside Karzai's Arg to criticize the United States and her policies.

Locally, especially in the light of the recent meetings between the Afghan government and the delegation of Hizb-e-Islami, led by the fugitive Hikmatyar, Karazai's policy has met not only with skepticism, but also with outright indignation. The Afghan nation hates warlords, warlordism and all those persons and movements involved in war crimes. They believe in the right of the people to demand from their government to punish the criminals not to offer them amnesty, or in the case of President Karzai's government reward them with positions and undeserved rights and recognition.

Most recent moves by the Hizb-e-Islami insurgents in northern Afghanistan in the form of fighting Taleban forces were not for the sake of the country, but a war for turf and for reaping financial rewards in the form of taxing the hard working and oppressed farmers in the countryside. This happens when the central government of Karzai cannot safeguard the interests and security of these farmers and of the general populace. Any leaning by the rural population toward Taleban and the insurgency is a direct result of the government's in ability to guarantee the security of its citizens against Taleban and warlords. The fact that Hizb forces in their fight against Taleban forces sought help from government shows the opportunistic attitude of the insurgency.

Furthermore Karzai's attempts to show that he personally is independent of the United States influence and as a matter of fact criticizing the US for its schemes to continue the war on terror in Afghanistan and to remain in the region indefinitely do not go well with Washington. The US has invested billions of Dollars in Afghanistan and would not like to be treated in an unfriendly manner by its president who in actuality owes his position and power to the US support.

Internationally, Pakistan seems to feel happy with the movement as it would minimize attention to its own problems with Pakistani Taleban and insurgency. The United Nations, in an effort to make a statement that it is also a player has already covertly conducted talks with Taleban. The US, on the other hand, emphasizes the fact that narco-funds and corruption in general contribute to the prolongation of war in the country and that it might be more worthwhile to focus on improving governance rather than conducting talks with known terrorist groups.

Russia and India as well as Iran are showing interest in Afghanistan's case because of their own problems with terrorism and fear of its repercussions.

It is under these circumstances that Mr. Karzai has conducted his first round of inconclusive talks with the Hizb-e-Islami delegation. It is interesting to note that Hizb-e-Islami has acted in these talks as if it were in a position of strength and not the government. It, and not the government of Afghanistan, has come up with a 19 point proposal dictating its conditions for talks and reconciliation. On the other hand, Taleban have hesitated for a variety of reasons to show any true interest in talks with the government. In either case one of the most sensitive conditions put forward in the past and now in the multi-point proposal by the Hizb-e-Islami is withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan, a condition that President Karzai is not in a position or at freedom to accept. Furthermore, the Hiz proposal calls for establishment of a government of reconciliation which means a green light for Hikmatyar to reenter Afghan politics. This also shows Hikmatyars craze for power. But when he was in power in the position of Afghanistan's prime minister during the Mujahidin government, he used his power to destroy together with his opponent Masoud the beautiful city of Kabul and annihilate thousands of its innocent residents. The Afghans cannot easily forget such atrocities.

However, it is a good thing that the door to the talks is left open. It is also good that the time given by the Hizb delegation for returning to the second round of talks, if any, would be many weeks. It is hoped that President Karzai uses this time to further scrutinize his policies regarding the talks, make his position clear that it will not be him alone, but the Afghan nation that would decide on a return of the fugitive warlord Hikmatyar to Afghan political scene and that he would make sure also that he would conduct any further talks from a position of strength and not of weakness.

He should let the spectators of his political chess game and his advisors make up their minds to give him information, support and encouragement, not at the scene of the game, but prior to it and not shout out moves while the game is in progress. A neutral, efficient and experienced referee in the form of an organization may also prove useful. Furthermore, he should give away the thought of his own indispensability. 4/01/2010