Complex, convoluted, mixed up, confused, upside down, checked and awaiting a mate could be some of the adjectives one could easily use in relation to the situations in Afghanistan. Situations that you would expect a strong leader, in many instances, the president, would be able to fix up. However, the Afghan president, a prisoner of circumstance from day one of his assignment to Afghan politics, finds it too difficult to address the giant issues threatening his administration. Here is why:



Hamid Karzai was chosen at the fateful Bonn Meeting in 2001 to head an interim government in Afghanistan. His choice was based on the former King's familiarity with Hamid's father, a tribal leader and a deputy at the Afghan National Assembly of the Royal era. He was chosen over a non-Pashtun supporter of the King, namely Professor Abdul Satar Seerat, a former Minister of Justice during the King's reign and a staunch supporter of the King before and throughout the decade of the Afghan nation's war against the puppet regime and the occupation forces of the Soviet Red Army.

Hamid Karzai, a rather young person was familiar with the Afghan war against the Soviet forces of occupation, the Afghan Jihad and mujaddin and was involved in the Jihad himself. The United States, through Zalmai Khalilzad who later became the US Ambassador after his assignment as Ambassador to Iraq and an Afghan American, favored Hamid Karzai over Abdul Seerat because of his tribal background and his familiarity with the United States politics. When he found himself at the helm, he also found out that besides his bodyguards from the US who were also paid by the US, he was alone among a pack of so-called Mujahidin who had earlier on fought among themselves and then fought against the Taliban and had lost their battles to the new force and had failed to run a viable and peaceful government. They had just become aware of their failed efforts and lost positions and prestige and with Hamid Karzai they were determined to claim both because they had sided with the US in toppling down the Taliban regime. The United States too, let them do this. The Interim president Karzai was assigned a cabinet that was not his own choice. For example to appease the Shura-e-Nizaar, and the Rabbani group, he was assigned Abdullah Abdullah to be his foreign minister. That is the same person who ran for President against Karzai during the last presidential elections and lost and who is leading the opposition forces in the hope of getting back a position in the Afghan government preferably one that would support his interests and satisfy his ego. The President therefore, had to keep the warlords and the so-called mujahidin leaders happy so that they would support him. He did just that. Therefore, he began as a leader who out of personal necessity shared his government and power with the US military, the warlords and their puppets, the United Nations, the United States and even a dead person namely Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of a military faction of freedom fighters from the district of Panjshair and a member of the Jameeat Party of Burhanuddin Rabbani and who was assassinated by an Arab terrorist two days prior to September 11, 2001.

Then two important events happened in Afghanistan: the promulgation of a democratic constitution and presidential elections. The country voted overwhelmingly for Karzai putting all their hopes for peace and prosperity in the hands of the new face in Afghan politics. The constitution was an exemplary achievement in the way to democracy in Afghanistan. Karzai should have understood the enormity of this achievement and should have freed himself from the claws of the warlords as soon as he won the elections and should have befriended his nation by rolling up his sleeves to build, side by side with his fellow countrymen, a new Afghanistan on the ashes of the long war. However, he shrouded himself in a traditional cape, the Chapan, and failed to show strength as a strong leader, to suppress the power of the warlords, and to endear himself to the nation. Although somewhat his hands were tied also by the international forces that were fighting a war on terror in his country without any coordination or cooperation with his government and in fact were an independent military machinery imposed on his writ, he could have strived to correct this situation by taming the unchecked activity of the international forces and or bringing some amount of coordination between his government and the foreign forces. He did not do this.

The war continued and, because of the war and his inability to endear himself to the nation, he was left lonesome once again within the compounds of his presidential palace, surrounded by advisers who were either influenced by dividing forces within the country or movements in support of ethnic, religious or linguistic interests or were enticed by selfish neighbors to serve their interests rather than those of the country. Of course the whole cadre denied this and on the surface promised unity, but surrendered to the possibility of being influenced by foreign and especially neighboring governments. It is also true that there are few people in the team that have true nationalistic ideals.

This was not a healthy atmosphere and thus the haphazard attempts for the rebuilding of the dilapidated infrastructure or improving the economy were not as successful as they could have been under a solid, just, fearless and sound administration. Wastage of aid money happened in billions in the country and there was and still there is no mechanism to prevent this wastage. This further fanned the fire of corruption in Afghanistan, where a majority of the population witnessed and witness a group of warlords and government officials living in mansions as kings while unemployment and adverse economic conditions gives rise to unprecedentged poverty and crime.

Corruption started to expand and polluted the system of government from top to bottom. The ordinary citizens were alienated further from the government in that they found themselves forced to pay bribes for the simplest interaction with the government. The President remained trapped within his presidential castle and so did his writ. Minor successes did happen though. Some roads were asphalted. Some new roads were extended. These served mostly the conduct of the war on terror rather than the citizens of the country. Some new schools opened and many were destroyed by the violent and reactionary forces of Taliban. Some hospital beds and buildings were added, but most of them lack supplies and equipment and most important trained personnel.

The President also found himself in need of money to buy favors and supporters. This need probably was so powerful that he even allowed acceptance of cash from the government of Iran given to his administration as a gift for expenditures of the Presidential office. The question still remains whether Iran wanted any favors in return for this cash gift?

Strange things happened in the mean time in the country. To begin with a minister of transportation in his cabinet was assassinated very early in his administration. The President promised investigation into the crime. To date, almost a decade after the event, the investigation has failed to conclude or give any answer to the question of who committed the crime and why? Then many similar incidents happened in the country including casualties of the civilian population in air raids and in military attacks. Investigations were promised, very little if anything came out of the investigations as if the word investigation was used to ameliorate the anger of the public during the acute phases.

Then infractions of law and order happened by known warlords. The government took a few preliminary steps in order to get the accused to stand trial at a court of law, but in majority of cases the President had to back out from the actions of his government in favor of the accused culprits granting them pardons and excusing them from attending court trials. This was all because he and his government were both weak and could not stand a direct conflict with the powerful warlords. The cases of Abdul Rashid Dostum and The Kabul Bank are two examples.

In international sphere, the President's relations with the United States came under strain. Karzai had, on a few instances, openly criticized the conduct of the US military and or the US intentions. The US, a superpower, was not happy with such behavior nor could it stand open criticism of the US policy in Afghanistan while it spend billions of dollars in Afghanistan and its youth sacrificed their lives in the war on terror.
None of these instances help Presient Hamid Karzai who still remains a president isolated from the people in his bastion with tall walls and protected by unerring guards which are a necessity given the conditions of insecurity. He is slowly losing support by the Western governments. His stance regarding the Pakistani military barrage of missiles on Afghanistan, perhaps diplomatically evolved, has not been understood by his nation, who would rather get killed than be targeted by any foreign force. This too, has helped keep him at a distance from his national base.
One decade in politics has taught him invaluable lessons in politics and diplomacy, but he is hesitating to use his knowledge in correcting the many wrongs in his country and his administration.

Because of these many political observers agree that this President is a prisoner of circumstance who has the keys to the prison door, but does have the strength to open the gate, come out, roll his sleeves, stand upright and frealess against warlords and criminal elements both in his country and his administration, and dress the wounds of Afghanistan. There is still time- though little, to take action and he should take this chance. 07/09/11